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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTE PROHIBITING ADVERTIS-

ING BY DENTISTS.-An interesting illustration of the lengths to
which a state may go in its exercise of police power is found in the
case of Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners,1 just
decided by the United States Supreme Court. The case is particularly apt at the present time because there is now pending in
the Illinois Supreme Court a similar case, involving the constitutionality of the amendments to the Dental Practice Act,
added in 1933, to the prior Dental Practice Act of 1909. The
Illinois case is based in part on language in that statute which
is the counterpart of language in the Oregon statute, here held
valid by the Supreme Court.
The plaintiff in the Oregon case, a practising dentist, brought
his bill in the state court to enjoin enforcement of the statute
on the ground that it was repugnant to the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
impaired the obligation of contracts in violation of Section 10,
Article I, of the Constitution of the United States. The trial
179 L. Ed. 595 (1935).
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court sustained a demurrer thereto, and the state supreme court
affirmed, whereupon the case was sent on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.
The particular provision of the statute complained of related
to grounds for revocation of a dentist's license, the following
grounds being set forth: "advertising professional superiority
or the performance of professional services in a superior manner; advertising prices for professional service; advertising by
means of large display, glaring light signs, or containing as a
part thereof the representation of a tooth, teeth, bridge work or
any portion of the human head; employing or making use of
advertising solicitors or free publicity press agents; or advertising any free dental work, or free examination; or advertising
to guarantee any'2 dental service, or to perform any dental operation painlessly."
The plaintiff claimed that he had continuously advertised
his services and used such signs and advertising solicitors, but
that his advertisements were truthful and made in good faith.
He alleged that he had made contracts for advertising of which
he would be unable to take advantage if the legislation in question were sustained, and that in that event his business would be
destroyed or materially impaired.
The court held the statute constitutional and said that the
plaintiff was not entitled to complain of interference with his
contracts if the regulation of his conduct as a dentist was not
an unreasonable exercise of the police power of the state, as
his contracts were necessarily subject to that authority; that
the statute was not discriminatory, but based upon a reasonable
classification.
The court said that the state was interested in providing
safeguards against deception and practice which would "tend to
demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the
least scrupulous. What is generally called the 'ethics' of the
profession is but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such standards.' ' The court held that to accomplish
its purpose the legislature could pass a general rule, even though
in particular instances the results might be detrimental because
advertising statements made might be true and not intended
to deceive.
The similar section of the Illinois act which is involved in
the case of Winberry v. Hallihan et al.,4 now pending on appeal
to the Illinois Supreme Court direct from the Superior Court of
Cook County, reads in part as follows:
2 Oregon Laws, 1933, Ch. 166.

3 79 L. Ed. 595, 597.
4 Supreme Court of Illinois, Case No. 22528.
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"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to
publish, directly or indirectly, or circulate any fraudulent, false
or misleading statements as to the skill or method of practice
of any person or operator; or in any way to advertise to practice
dentistry without causing pain; or to advertise in any manner
with a view of deceiving the public, or in any way that will tend
to deceive or defraud the public; or to claim superiority over
neighboring dental practitioners;or to publish reports of cases
or certificates of same in any public advertising media; or to
advertise as using any anesthetic, drug, formula, material,
medicine, method or system which is either falsely advertised or
misnamed; or to advertise free dental services or examinations
as an inducement to secure dental patronage; or to advertise
any amount as a price or fee for the service or services of any
person engaged as principal or agent in the practice of dentistry,
or for any material or materials whatsoever used or to be used;
or to employ 'cappers' or 'steerers' to obtain patronage; or to
exhibit or use specimens of dental work, posters or any other
media calling attention of the public to any person engaged in
the practice of dentistry; or to give a public demonstration of
skill or methods of practicing dentistry upon or along the
streets or highways, or any other place than his office where
he is known to be regularly engaged in the practice of his profession, and any person committing an offense against any of
the provisions of this section, shall, upon conviction, be subjected
to such penalties as are provided in this Act"; then follow
certain exceptions as to size of professional cards permitted,
etc., not here material. 5 The italicized portions in the above
substantially correspond to provisions in the Oregon act which
have been held constitutional in the Semler case. Although the
Illinois statute has been attacked on other grounds, the principal
emphasis is on the claim that it is illogical, unreasonable, and
discriminatory to prohibit such practices as far as dentists are
concerned, while permitting them to physicians, optometrists,
oculists, and medical institutes. What will be the decision in
the Illinois Supreme Court is only matter of speculation at this
time, but it is certain to have far reaching effects, in view of
the present vogue for advertising among the members of the
dental profession. 6
HELEN W. MTuNSERT
DIRECTED VERDICT UNDER CIVIL PRACTICE ACT.-In the recent
case of Herbst v. Levy,1 the Illinois Appellate Court held that
5 Smith-Hurd, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 91, sec. 72b.
6 Since this went to press, the Illinois Supreme Court, on June 14, 1935,
upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois Dental Practice Act, in Winberry
v. Hallihan et al., Case No. 22528.
1279 Ill. App. 353 (1935).
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the provisions of the Civil Practice Act 2 permitting the trial
court to reserve decision upon a motion for a directed verdict,
are not applicable to a motion by the defendant at the close
of the plaintiff's evidence, when the plaintiff has failed to prove
a prima facie case.
In reserving judgment upon such a motion, the trial court
admitted that there was no "competent evidence of negligence
that could properly have been submitted to the jury," but
said, "the new practice seems to contemplate this case going to
the jury." The jury found for the plaintiff, and the court entered judgment on the verdict.
In reversing the judgment, the Appellate Court held that
the provisions of the Civil Practice Act are applicable only to
those cases where the defendant has introduced evidence; that
as to those cases where the motion is made at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence, the common law is still applicable.
This construction seems preferable to that given the statute
by the court below. The Civil Practice Act refers only to motions "at the close of the testimony." The construction given
the act below might frequently, as here, work an unfair hardship upon the defendant, in that if the plaintiff totally failed
to prove a cause of action, the evidence introduced by the
defendant might be sufficient to carry the case to the jury.
Moreover, there is no great need for a statutory change in
this respect. The common law rule with respect to such motions
was sufficiently liberal and allowed the trial court adequate
discretionary power in doubtful cases. In McDermott v. Burke,3
the Illinois Supreme Court sustained the action of the trial
court in refusing to direct a verdict at the end of the plaintiff's
case, and in reserving decision until defendant's evidence was
in, where there was no showing that the judge based his ruling
upon a preponderance of the evidence, rather than merely upon
that of the plaintiff. A similar decision was announced five
years later by the Illinois Appellate Court in Arrigoni v.
Strassheim.4 There the court sustained the reservation of judgment, but held specifically that only the plaintiff's evidence
might be considered in arriving at a decision.
It is interesting to note that the construction contended for
by the court below in the principal case would practically
abolish directed verdicts, and leave only in their stead judgments
non obstante veredicto.
W. J. J. WAHLER
Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 110, sec. 196.
8256 l1. 401, 100 N. E. 168 (1912).
4207 Ill. App. 354 (1917).
2
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LIMITATION THAT ExERcISE OF POLICE POWER MUST BE
REASONABLE WITH RESPECT TO IMPOSING EXPENSE OF GRADE
CROSSING UPON RAILROAD.-The recent United States Supreme

Court case of Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway v.
Herbert S. Walters, Commissioner of Highways' presents a
somewhat novel application of two familiar principles of constitutional law: First, the state may, under its police power,
impose upon a railroad the whole cost of eliminating a grade
crossing, or such part thereof as it deems appropriate; second,
the police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that
it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably. The railroad
commenced this action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act of Tennessee 2 against the Commissioner of Highways
and the Attorney General to test the constitutionality of an
order entered by the Commission and, as so applied, of a Tennessee statute upon which the order was based.8 The statute
authorized the Commission whenever a state highway crosses
a railway to require the separation of grades if in its discretion
"the elimination of any such grade crossing is necessary for
the protection of persons traveling on any such highway or
any such railroad"; and requires the railroad in every instance
to pay half the total expense. After hearing some 492 pages of
evidence, the trial court held that the order and the statute
as applied to the present case were arbitrary and unreasonable
and ordered the entire cost of the project to be borne by the
State Highway Commission. The evidence in question tended
to prove, and according to the finding of the trial court, did
substantially prove, that the highway was not essential to the
local transportation needs of the rural community where the
underpass was located; that such underpass was prescribed as
part of a system of Federal aid highways and as such would
principally benefit motor busses in direct competition with the
railroad; and that the railroad was already paying in the form
of taxes more than its proportionate share of the cost of highways for the advantage and convenience of such motor busses.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the decree of the
trial court, and declined to consider the special facts relied upon
as showing that the order, and the statute as applied, were arbitrary and unreasonable.
The Supreme Court of the United States (Justices Stone and
Cardozo dissenting upon the ground that the facts do not sustain
the charge of arbitrariness and unreasonableness; and Justice
179 L. Ed. 458 (1935).
2 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1923, Ch. 29.
3 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1921, Ch. 32, entitled "An act to provide for the elimination of grade crossings on State Highways"; amended 1923, Ch. 35; 1925,
Ch. 88.
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Reynolds taking no part in the decision) reversed and remanded,
holding that a statute valid when enacted may be invalid by
change in the conditions to which it is applied, and that here the
court had erred in refusing to consider evidence tending to prove
that the statute was arbitrary and not a reasonable exercise of
the police power.
The general power of a state to require a railroad to bear
all or a share of such expense as that here involved is well sustained by the decisions. In New York & New England Railroad
Company v. Town of Bristol,4 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that, where it appeared that a state railroad commission, by virtue of a statute which authorized it to require a
railroad to alter or abolish dangerous crossings, had ordered a
railroad to remove such a crossing at its own expense and to
replace it with an overhead bridge, the statute was a valid exercise of the police power.
In North Dakota State Highway Commission v. Great Northern Railway Company,5 the Supreme Court of North Dakota
held that the railroad commission could compel a railroad to
eliminate a grade crossing by constructing an underpass and
that the exercise of such authority did not constitute a violation
of the railroad's constitutional rights. A similar result was
reached by the New York Court of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court in Re Staten Island Rapid Transit Comin Erie
pany,6 and by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
7
Railway Company v. Public Service Commission.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Chicago, Milwaukee, and St.
Paul Railroad Company v. Lake County8 used this language:
"A railroad is a public utility, and the state may, in the exercise of its police power-and it is its duty where the public
safety demands it-require the separation of grade crossings
for the preservation of human life and the protection of property." In Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company v.
Illinois Commerce Commission,9 the Illinois Supreme Court
said: "The police power of the state is, however, in matters
touching the public safety, a broad one, and, undoubtedly, for
the promotion of public safety, railroad property may in a
proper case be subjected to uncompensated obedience to police
regulation; and the railroad company compelled to relocate its
Ct. 367, 38 L. Ed. 269 (1894).
551 N. D. 680, 200 N. W. 796 (1924).
6245 N. Y. 643, 157 N. E. 892 (1927); error dismissed in 276 U. S. 603,
72 L. Ed. 726 (1928).
7271 Pa. 409, 114 A. 357 (1921).
8287 IM. 337, 122 N. E. 526 (1919).
9326 11.625, 158 N. E. 376 (1927).
4 151 U. S. 556, 14 S.
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crossing of a highway and at its expense change from an overhead crossing to a subway when necessary to promote or preserve the public safety. The orders and decisions of the commission are subject to review as to the reasonableness of its conclusions." Similar language was used by the same court in
Commerce Commission ex rel. Bloomington v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, and St. Louis Railway Company,10 and in
Town of Sidney v. Wabash Railway Company."
The principle that the police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or
unreasonably is supported by an abundance of case authority.
If the statute is arbitrary or unreasonable it is unconstitutional
as constituting a deprivation of property without due process
of law.
In Nectow v. Cambridge,12 in declaring a zoning act unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court said: "The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the
general rights of the landowner by restricting the character of
his use is not unlimited, and, other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."
In the case of Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad
Company v. Town of Morristown,13 the United States Supreme
Court held that a municipal corporation cannot, without making
compensation therefor, establish a public hack stand upon a
driveway maintained by a railroad company upon its own
property to afford to the public means of ingress and egress to
its station, which has not been dedicated as a public highway.
It is difficult to predict the probable effect of the principal
case. The decision is particularly opportune with respect to
President Roosevelt's announced intention of spending a substantial portion of the new Federal recovery appropriation for
the elimination of dangerous railroad crossings. The court
stressed the element of Federal aid in the construction of the
highway, and pointed to the presence of such aid as indicative
of a purpose to accommodate high-speed, long-distance motor
traffic, likely to compete with the railroads. While it is true that
the case merely reiterates well accepted principles of constitutional law, such a decision must be reassuring to the railroads
at a time when, in the incessant struggle between rights of
property and the police power, the police power is conspicuously
in the ascendency.
G. S.
10309
11333
12 277
18276

STANSELL

IlM.165, 140 N. E. 868 (1923).
Ill.
126, 164 N. E. 201 (1928).
U. S. 183, 48 S. Ct. 447, 72 L. Ed. 842 (1928).
U. S. 182, 48 S. Ct. 276, 72 L. Ed. 523 (1928).
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NOTICE OF APPEAL ESSENTIAL TO CONFER JURISDICTION
APPELLATE COURT.-In Wishard v. School Directors,' the

ON

Illi-

nois Appellate Court said with respect to appeals: "This court
has no jurisdiction to consider the case in the absence of a

notice of appeal. It is a requirement of the statute and is a
matter that cannot be waived by agreement of parties nor supplied by estoppel arising out of the conduct of either party.
No appeal has been perfected; there is nothing to dismiss. The
order will be that the case be stricken from the docket."
Appellant had appealed from a judgment of the Circuit
Court of Jasper County entered June 12, 1934. Appellee moved

to dismiss and in support attached an affidavit of the clerk
of the circuit court showing that no notice of appeal had ever
been filed.
2
The court referred to its decision in Veack v. Hendricks,
where it said thaf "the filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and . . . the proceedings of the lower court cannot be

reviewed on appeal unless such notice has been filed. The right
of appeal is purely statutory and the statute granting such
right must be strictly complied with." 3
Appellants urged against the motion to dismiss the fact that
the appellees had actual notice of the appeal and subsequent
proceedings; that they entered an appearance; and that they
moved for an extension of time which was granted. Appellants
contended that such facts operated as a waiver and estoppel.
However, the court held, upon authority that when jurisdiction4
does not exist, it cannot be conferred by consent or acquiescence.
There is but little comment to be made. The court has held
that it is the filing of notice of appeal that confers jurisdiction
upon the appellate court. Since it is a statutory right no substitute will serve. Such notice is not merely to advise the opponent of an appeal, but is the way to reach the ears of the
reviewing court.
J. E. BRUNSWICK
RIGHT OF APPELLATE COURT TO DECREE PARTIAL REVERSAL OF

AGAINST JOINT TORTFEASOR.-In volume 278 of
the Illinois Appellate Court Reports there are reported three
cases involving the same point, two of which are decided one
way, and the third, in exactly the opposite way. Briefly the
JUDGMENT

1279 Il1. App. 333 (1935).
2278 Ill.
App. 376 (1935).
8 Hall v. First Nat. Bk., 330 IMI.234, 161 N. E. 311 (1928); Davison v.
Heinrich, 340 Ill. 349, 172 N. E. 770 (1930).
4 Miller v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 327 Ill. 103, 158 N. E. 441 (1927) ; Larson
v. Kalin & Co., 322 Ill. 147, 152 N. E. 595 (1926); C. P. & S. W. R. R. Co. v.
Marseilles, 84 Ill. 643 (1877).
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cases are as follows: (1) Rhoden v. Peoria Creamery Company,1
in which the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the Creamery Company and the Peoria Cartage Company for $20,000.
Both defendants appealed. The Appellate Court reversed and
remanded the judgment against both, although the verdict was
only against the weight of the evidence as to the cartage company; the court said: "The judgment being a unit as to both
the creamery company and the cartage company, it cannot be
affirmed as to one and reversed as to the other." (2) Adkins
v. Strathmore Company and Svoboda,2 in which the plaintiff
recovered a judgment against the two defendants for $750. In
this case only the company appealed and the court, holding
that the evidence did not justify a verdict against the company,
reversed as to it, but affirmed the judgment as to Svoboda, saying, "But the reversing of the judgment as to the defendant
Strathmore Company, a corporation, does not affect the judgment against the defendant Svoboda." (3) Fogel v. 134 N.
Clark St. Building Corporation et al.5 Here, again, a judgment
was recovered against two defendants, this time for $90, and
the defendant corporation appealed. The court reversed as
to the corporation and affirmed as to the defendant Deitz, saying
that section 92 of the Civil Practice Act gave it the right to
enter such an order. All three of these cases were heard after
January 1, 1934; all involved judgments against joint tortfeasors; and in none of them was a partial new trial ordered.
Prior to January of 1934, the law in Illinois was well settled
that a judgment against joint tortfeasors was a unit and could
not be reversed as to one alone. The most recent treatment
of the point by the Supreme Court, prior to January 1, 1934,
is found in Livak v. Chicago and Erie Railroad Company.4 In
that case, the judgment was in tort, and it was argued that the
Supreme Court had the power to decree a partial reversal of
the judgment. The court held otherwise, and said: "This court
has held for about 70 years, beginning with McDonald v. Wilkie,
13 Ill. 22, that a judgment against several defendants, whether
rendered in an action for tort or on a contract, is a unit and cannot be reversed as to one or more defendants and affirmed as to
1278 Ill. App. 452 (1935).
2 278 111. App. 183 (1935).
3278 11. App. 286 (1935).
4 299 111. 218, 132 N. E. 524 (1921).
The court here cited Seymour v.
77 (1903), which was an action of assumpsit
Richardson Fueling Co., 205 Ill.
and the verdict was for the plaintiff against four defendants. The court there
said, "The money judgment thus rendered was a unit as to all the defendants,
and upon appeal the judgment must be reversed as to all the defendants if
reversed as to any one of them." and cited cases of many jurisdictions and
the works of Chitty, Black, and Waite.
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the others." The McDonald case, 5 to which the court referred,
was an action for damages for assault and battery, and the
trial resulted in a judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court, on appeal, reversed as to all the defendants, and said:
"A judgment, jointly entered in favor of several defendants,
whether in an action upon contract or for tort cannot be affirmed
as to one and reversed as to another. Such a judgment is an
entirety, and must stand or fall together."
The Appellate
Court has been just as definite in the matter as has the Supreme
Court. In a 1932 decision, here in the First District, the court,
in reversing a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff, said:
"It is unavoidable, though regrettable, that the judgment as to
both defendants must be reversed, as a judgment against two
defendants is a unit, and if it must be reversed for error against
one, it must be reversed as to both. "6
Since the law in this regard is so well settled, it is strange
that two out of three very recent cases should have held differently. The reason, as the court in the Fogel case pointed out,
is the Civil Practice Act, which provides:
"See. 92. Powers of reviewing court. (1) In all appeals the
reviewing court may, in its discretion, and on such terms as
it deems just,"(f) give any judgment and make any order which ought
to have been given or made, and make such other and further
orders and grant such relief, including a remandment, a partial
reversal, the order of a partial new trial, the entry of a remittitur, or the issuance of execution, as the case may be." It
will be noted that the only difference between this section, and
sections 110 and 111 of the Practice Act of 1907,7 is the provision allowing the Appellate Court to grant a partial reversal,
so that the practice under the new provision will be the same,
in this regard, as it has been in the past, at least in the opinion
5 McDonald v. Wilkie et al., 13 Ill.
22 (1851).
6 McDermott v. A. B. C. Oil Burner Sales Corp., 266 111. App. 115 (1932).
See also, Christensen v. Johnson and Johnson, 207 Ill.
App. 209 (1917), and
Freeman v. Dixon, 233 fll. App. 196 (1924).
7 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1931), Ch. 110, sec. 110: "In all cases of appeal
and writ of error, the Supreme Court or Appellate Court may give final judgment and issue execution or remand the cause to the inferior court, in order
that an execution may be there issued or that other proceedings may be had
thereon. Any judgment rendered in the Supreme Court or Appellate Court shall
become a lien on real estate after execution shall be issued and levied and a
certificate thereof filed in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county
where the real estate levied on is situated.
"Sec. 111: The Supreme Court or Appellate Court, in case of a partial
reversal, shall give such judgment or decree as the inferior ought to have
given, and for this purpose may allow the entering of a remittitur, either in
term time or in vacation, or remand the cause to the inferior court for
further proceedings, as the case may require."

-
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of two members of the formulating committee, Edward W.
Hinton8 and 0. L. McCaskill. 9 In other words, both before the
Civil Practice Act and since its passage the reviewing court
has had the right to decree a partial reversal such as was
decreed in the Adkins and Fogel cases. Even under that act,
however, the court has held that where such partial reversal is
decreed the matters must be separate and distinct. "Under similar statutes on practice as our own above quoted, courts of
last resort in this country have generally followed the rule that
where a judgment appealed from consists of distinct and independent matters, so that an erroneous portion thereof can be
segregated from the parts that are correct, the court will not
set aside the entire judgment but only so much as is erroneous,
leaving the residue undisturbed. Where a judgment is entire
and indivisible, it cannot be reversed in part and affirmed in
part, and if there is reversible error therein it must be set
aside in toto ....
This court has followed the rule both in law
and in chancery cases."10 Hence, it is clear that prior to the
Civil Practice Act the judgments in the Adkins and Fogel cases
could not have been reversed in part, since it is certain and
undisputed that a judgment against joint tortfeasors is not
separable and distinct in any way. Therefore, since the provisions in the Civil Practice Act and the Practice Act of 1907
are practically the same, and since the Adkins and Fogel cases
could not have been partially reversed under the former act,
there seems to be some doubt as to the propriety of the court
acting as it did. Perhaps the liberality intended by the Civil
Practice Act was stretched a little too far!

G. E.
TRESPASS

AB INITIO

AS APPLIE

HALL

TO THE LAW

OF ARREST.-

Trespass ab initio, a fiction of ancient origin, was designed for
the purpose of providing a remedy for wrongs done to property
where an entry on the land, or the taking of a chattel was justified by virtue of a license. The difficulty involved in allowing
an action of trespass in such cases lay in the fact that since the
original entry or seizure was privileged, there was no trespass.
To circumvent this difficulty, the subsequent abuse of the priv8 Stenographic Report of Lectures. given in Law 447 at the University College, October, November, December, 1933, Edward W. Hinton, (Distributed by
the University of Chicago Bookstore), 296: "(f) To give judgment, and so
forth, which is simply a re-enactment of the old Practice Act, I believe."
9 Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated, (0. L. McCaskill, editor, The Foundation Press, Inc., 1933), 339: "Subsection (1, f) is a combination of sections
110 and 111 of the Practice Act of 1907, and except in one respect, that of
a partial new trial, there will be no change in the practice formerly obtaining
under those sections."
167, 139 N. E. 60 (1923).
10 City of Kewanee v. Pusker, 308 11M.
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ilege by the actor was taken as conclusive evidence of his original
intent. The doctrine, although always confined to acts privileged
by law, was soon after its origin allowed to be extended to serve
purposes beyond that for which it was created.
In most instances, although the reason for the doctrine has
failed, it still survives and has found application in wrongs to
the person as well as to property. Although some courts have
sought to limit it, the New York Supreme Court recently held
in Dumas v. Erie Railroad Company' that an arrest, though
legal in its inception, was illegal ab initio where during the
period of detention the defendants brutally treated the person
arrested in order to extort a confession from him.
The plaintiff had been suspected of stealing an automobile,
and it was not contended that the arrest in the first instance
was unlawful. This was an action for false imprisonment
brought to recover for the wrongful detention and injuries sustained from the brutal treatment inflicted on him for the purpose of extorting a false confession. The court said: "Whether
or not the period of detention was so utilized was a question
for the jury, and their finding that it was so utilized, made the
detention illegal from the inception and deprived the defendants of the protection that otherwise would have been theirs if
the arrest were legal in its inception and there had been no
such illegal purpose carried out during the period of detention."
Although the decision would probably have been different
on the same set of facts in England, or in several of the
jurisdictions in this country, there is abundant authority to
support it, 2 and it is in line with the prior decisions in New
York.8 The theory on which they proceed is that if one is to
protect himself by virtue of legal process in obedience to which
he has imprisoned, or restrained the plaintiff, the officer must
prove that he acted in compliance with the law. If he fails to
do so, the defense afforded him by his process wholly fails and
he is said to be a trespasser ab initio. In Vermont, retroactive
liability was imposed in Gibson v. Holmes4 by virtue of a statute.
There appear to be three lines of decisions in this country with
reference to the retroactive liability of an officer who makes an
1278 N. Y. S. 197 (1935).
2 Pettitt v. Colmery, 20 Del. 266, 55 A. 244 (1903) ; Stewart v. Feeney, 118
Iowa 524, 92 N. W. 670 (1902) ; Leger v. Warren, 62 Ohio St. 500, 57 N. E.
506 (1900).
"Neither does it justify an unreasonable detention and deprivation of one's
liberty. There is in other jurisdictions an abundance of authority to the effect
that unlawful detention, following a lawful arrest by the sheriff, makes him a
trespasser ab initio." Oxford v. Berry, 204 Mich. 197, 170 N. E. 83 (1897).
8 People v. Mummiani, 258 N. Y. 394, 180 N. E. 94 (1932).
478 Vt. 110, 62 A. 567 (1905).
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arrest under lawful process and subsequently abuses his
privilege.
In the first class we may put the cases that hold the actor
is liable where the wrongful intent is acquired at any time,
either before or after the arrest. Dumas v. Erie Railroad Company falls within this group as well as do the prior decisions of
the New York courts.
The second class includes cases that hold that the officer is not
liable ab initio if the wrongful intent is acquired subsequent to
the arrest, but that he is if the arrest was made for a wrongful
purpose. In Freisenhanv. Maines5 the Supreme Court of Michigan said: "Unlawful detention following an arrest does not
make him a trespasser ab initio unless the original arrest was
made with the intent of being used for the subsequent wrong."
Although the writer was unable to find a case directly in point,
it appears that Illinois would also come within this group. In
Slomer v. People6 the plaintiff was arrested under lawful process for the purpose of extorting money from him. The court
said: "When the prisoner had proved an imprisonment, it was
for the defense to make out a justification; and we think in this
case, in view of the facts appearing in the evidence it failed.
The law will not permit the use of criminal process for the
accomplishment of a private purpose, and when it is used for
the purpose of extortion, it will not be allowed to screen the prosecutor or those conspiring with him from punishment for false
imprisonment."
In the third group are the cases which hold that there is no
retroactive liability whether the wrongful intent was acquired
before or after the arrest. The Massachusetts court said in
Wood v. Bailey,7 "An action for false imprisonment cannot be
maintained, but an action would lie for malicious abuse of criminal process."
The Restatement of the Law of Torts8 does not seem to recognize the doctrine of trespass ab initio with respect to the law
of arrest. The following excerpt is taken from that work: "If
the actor abuses the custody which he has taken under a privileged arrest by any form of misconduct ... he is liable for the
harm done thereby. His misconduct does not make him liable
for any 'assault' or 'battery' committed in making the arrest
or maintaining his custody prior to his misconduct; nor does it
make him liable for the confinement imposed by the privileged
arrest and custody. A fortiori, the actor's subsequent miscon5 137 Mich. 10, 100 N. W. 172 (1904).
625 1. 58 (1860).
7 144 Mass. 365, 11 N. E. 567, 59 Am. Rep. 95 (1887).
8 Par. 278.
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duct does not affect the other's liability for any force which he
used in resisting the privileged arrest or in escaping or attempting to escape, nor does it affect the immunity to a third person,
who prior to the misconduct, has assisted the actor in making the
arrest, or maintaining his custody."
Messrs. Bohlen and Schulman, in their article, Effect of Subsequent Misconduct upon Lawful Arrest,9 deprecate the application of trespass ab initio to the law of arrest and contend
that it is an unwarranted extension of the doctrine. It does
appear, however, that the jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine are in the majority, and that their reasoning, although not
strictly in accordance with the early concepts, as laid down in
the Six Carpenters' Case,10 is not without merit.
W. R. MACMILLAN
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION TO AvoID MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS.In the recent case of Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance
Company,' the Illinois Supreme Court held that in order to
avoid a multiplicity of suits equity may entertain jurisdiction
of a bill brought to recover upon fire insurance policies issued
by sixteen different companies, and to have the loss apportioned
among them. The policies were "standard" ones and each contained a provision for prorating the aggregate loss on the property in the proportion that the insurance written under each
policy might bear to the total insurance carried.
The court admitted that the question of jurisdiction was one
of first impression in Illinois, recognized the fact that there was
a conflict of authority, quoted Pomeroy, observed that "it is one
of the favorite objects of a court of equity to do full and complete justice between the parties by avoiding the delays and
hardships incident to a multiplicity of suits,'"2 and then dwelt
upon the practical difficulties of disposing of the matter through
separate suits at law. The court pointed out that separate juries
might very easily arrive at conflicting verdicts; also that in the
present case the apportionment of the loss to the several insurers involved a complicated accounting problem, which merited equitable relief. It is, perhaps, to be regretted that the
court did not base its decision solely upon the last ground mentioned, an equitable accounting.
928 Col. L. Rev. 841 (1928).
108 Co. Rep. 146a, 77 Eng. Rep. 695 (1610).
'359 Ill.
584 (1935).
2 In support of this statement the court cited McGovern v. McGovern, 268
Ill. 135, a case of a bill to set aside deeds, and one in which no question
arose of equitable jurisdiction on the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of
suits.
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There are two distinctly conflicting views upon this question:
one, that equity may assume jurisdiction whenever the rights
of the numerous persons depend for solution on the same questions of law and fact, though purely legal rights may be
involved, and purely legal relief may be conferred; 3 the other,
that "there must be some recognized ground of equitable interference, or some community of interest in the subject matter
of the controversy, or a common right or title involved, to warrant the joinder of all in one suit; or there must be some common purpose in pursuit of a common adversary, where each
may resort to equity, in order to be joined in one suit; and
it is not enough that there is a community of interest, merely,
in the questions of law or fact involved." The quotation is from
Tribette v. Illinois Central Railroad Company.4 There the
Supreme Court of Mississippi denied the power of equity to
enjoin the prosecution of actions at law and compel adjudication in a single suit, where a number of claimants had begun
actions against the railroad for destruction of their property
by fire. In Tomkins v. Craig5 the Federal Circuit Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused equitable jurisdiction
of a bill filed to collect amounts previously assessed against stockholders upon statutory "double liability," saying: "Each contest is a separate obligation, and should be separately enforced.
It is plain, also, that each defendant may desire to set up a
different defense. "6
Another Federal case, Scruggs and Echols v. American Central Insurance Company,7 is of especial interest here, because of
the factual similarity to the present case. There the court held
that one of several insurance companies which had issued policies on the same property, with provisions for apportioning
loss, might not maintain a bill in equity to compel an adjustment
of the liability on the several policies in one suit. The court
branded the bill as an obvious attempt on the part of the
insurance company to escape a jury trial.
The principal case arose, of course, before the new Civil Practice Act went into effect. In view of the fact that there could
be no question of the right of the court to permit the joinder
8 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), sec. 250 and 269; Eaton, Equity
(2d. ed.), p. 33; Preteca v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 50 F. 674 (1892);
Osborne v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 43 F. 826 (1890); Black v. Shreeve, 7
N. J. Eq. 440 (1848).
4 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32, 39 L. R. A. 660, 35 Am. St. Rep. 642 (1892).
593 F. 885 (1899).
6
In accord: Burke v. Scheer, 89 Neb. 80, 130 N. W. 962, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1057 (1911) ; Rogers v. Boston Club, 205 Mass. 261, 91 N. E. 321, 28 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 743 (1910).
7176 F. 224, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 92 (1910).
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of these defendants in a single action under the new practice,8
it may seem at first glance that the decision will have no application now. However, upon analysis it will be seen that the case
is decisive of the right to a jury trial in such proceedings. Since
the decision denotes the action as equitable rather than legal
at common law, parties will not be entitled as a matter of right to
a jury in similar cases under the new practice. Even in an
equitable action, of course, the court may in its discretion grant
a jury trial, both under the former practice 9 and under the
new Civil Practice Act.' 0
G. S. STANSELL
POWER OF SUPERIOR COURT TO ISSUE WRIT OF PROHIBITION TO

MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO AS INFERIOR COURT.-The writ of

prohibition is one of the extraordinary writs and seldom used
today, although its use dates back to early times, and was well
known to Blackstone. It is sometimes mistakenly considered to
be in the nature of a writ of review. In its essence it has always
been defined as a writ issuing from a "superior" court to an
"inferior" one, directed to prevent usurpation of a jurisdiction
which does not properly belong to such inferior court. The subject matter is by the writ thereby removed to the higher court,
but the higher court does not review the proceedings of the
other court. The test as to the power of a court to issue such
a writ of prohibition to another court is whether or not the
latter is inferior to the former, not in the sense that an appeal
will lie from the one to the other, but in the sense that one does
not have as broad jurisdiction as the other.
A recent instance of the writ of prohibition occurred in the
case of The People ex rel. Sokoll v. Municipal Court,1 wherein
the petitioner sought to have the Superior Court of Cook County
issue such a writ against the Municipal Court of Chicago, for the
purpose of prohibiting that court and a judge thereof from
exercising further jurisdiction over a contempt proceeding. The
defendant argued that because of the wide jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court, it was not inferior, although it did not have
jurisdiction of all cases cognizable in the Circuit and Superior
Courts. The Illinois Supreme Court held that it was proper for
such a writ to issue.
That case originated in the Municipal Court of Chicago as
a trial of a minor traffic violation. Certain irrelevant facts were
8 Cahill's

Ill.

Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 110, sec. 151, 152.

9 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1931), Ch. 22, sec. 40, now repealed
practice act.
10 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 110, sec. 191.

1359 Ill. 102, 194 N. E. 242 (1935).

by new
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disclosed during the course of the trial and of accompanying
contempt proceedings, which led Judge Green to declare publicly his intention to conduct a thorough investigation of the
alleged monopolies in the taxicab business in Chicago. He announced that he would have subpoenas duces tecum issued for
the books of certain taxicab companies and that he would inspect
such books to ascertain if the condition charged, in fact existed.
He further stated that he would strike any answers filed by the
defendants. Thereupon, two of those defendants, Sokoll and
Egan, brought the petition for a writ of prohibition in the
Superior Court of Cook County, directed against Judge Green
and the Municipal Court.
The principal question in the case was whether or not the
Municipal Court is inferior to the Superior Court, especially
since the recent amendments to the Municipal Court Act which
broadened its jurisdiction. This question had never been passed
on before, but there are several cases which help to determine
the issue.
In Reid v. Morton,2 the question arose as to whether the Alton
City Court was inferior to the circuit court, with which it had
concurrent jurisdiction within the city of Alton, in all civil
cases. The case did not involve a writ of prohibition, but it was
urged that only inferior local courts could be established in
cities under the Constitution of 1848, and that therefore the
Alton City Court never had any legal existence. In its decision
the court said it was not plain just what was meant by the
term "inferior," but that since the city court did not have
equal jurisdiction with the circuit court in criminal cases, and
its territorial limits of jurisdiction were less, it was, both in
dignity and jurisdiction, inferior to the circuit court, even
though it was a court of record.
The next important case bearing on the issue was Wolf v.
Hope,s wherein the question was as to the meaning of "inferior
court of record" as used in the act fixing the salaries of judges
of such courts; and there again it was held that the city court
of Alton was an inferior court of record, not in the sense that
an appeal would lie from it to the Circuit or Superior Court,
but in that it did not have as complete an original jurisdiction,
inasmuch as it was denied jurisdiction in cases of murder or
treason by the act which created it. With reference to the city
court, the Supreme Court said: "It was not a court of unlimited,
general jurisdiction, as are the circuit court and the superior
court, nor is the extent of the territory throughout which it may
exercise its jurisdiction as great as that throughout which may
2 119 11.118, 6 N. E. 414 (1886).
50, 70 N. E. 1082 (1904).
8 210 Ill.
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be exercised the jurisdiction of the circuit or superior court.
In these respects it is an inferior court . . . . "4 The test there
recognized by the court was whether or not jurisdiction was
equal-if not, then the court with less jurisdiction was inferior.
In Miller v. The People,5 an indictment charging an offense
committed in Cook County was brought up in the Municipal
Court, and the defendant argued that the jurisdiction of that
court was limited to the actual confines of Chicago. The court
held that such contention was correct, and said of municipal
courts in general: "They are limited, territorially, to the
municipality in and for which they are created, and their jurisdiction is usually limited in amount or to petty offenses." 6
Because of such territorial limits, these municipal courts cannot
be considered as being on the same level of jurisdiction with the
circuit courts or the Superior Court of Cook County.
Again, in Lott v. Davis,7 in discussing the distinctions between
the Municipal Court and the circuit courts, the court said
that the former lacked some of the more important classes of
jurisdiction of circuit courts-the entire chancery division, tort
actions for more than a stated sum, ejectment, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. Because of these limitations, the
Municipal Court cannot be regarded as of the same grade
as the circuit courts.
It was true, as the defendants in this petition said, that these
cases were all decided before the amendments to the Municipal
Court Act, but the Court itself is still subject to certain limitations. It has no jurisdiction beyond the city limits, whereas
the Superior Court of Cook County has jurisdiction throughout
the county. It has no general chancery jurisdiction, nor any
over felony cases, nor over certain torts, whereas the Superior
Court does have such jurisdiction, and may also issue the other
extraordinary writs of mandamus and the like. Basing, then,
the distinction on scope of jurisdiction, it must be held that
the Municipal Court, in relative rank, is inferior to the Superior
Court of Cook County and to the circuit courts.
After the court had found that such inferiority exists, the
next question was, did the Superior Court have power to issue
the writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court went rather deeply
into a discussion of that writ in The People v. Circuit Court,"
and pointed out that, as a prerogative writ, it was to be used
with caution and only to secure regularity of proceedings where
4 210 Ill.
50, 65, 70 N. E. 1082 (1904).

5230 Ill.
65, 82 N. E. 521 (1907).
6230 11. 65, 74, 82 N. E. 521 (1907).
7 264 fl1.
272, 106 N. E. 179 (1914).
8347 Il.34, 179 N. E. 441 (1932).
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there was no other adequate remedy. It was in itself a common
law remedy, and exists in this country unless abolished by
statute, which has not been done in Illinois. The court cited
The People v. Cook Circuit Court,9 which distinctly held that
the writ was never used to correct mere irregularities or to
perform the functions of an appeal or writ of error, and that
since the constitution did not provide original jurisdiction in
the state Supreme Court to issue a writ of prohibition, it could
only issue such a writ in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. After
such citation, the court went on to voice the general rule that
the writ may issue from the superior to the inferior court, but
considered the case mainly from the point of view that the
issuance was in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the superior
court.
In the case under discussion, as to the power of the Superior
Court of Cook County to issue the prohibition, there is no question of its being in aid of any appellate jurisdiction. According
to some of the wording in The People v. Circuit Court,10 the
only true purpose of the writ is to prevent an attempt on the
part of the inferior court to set aside a judgment of the superior
court once entered. No such situation exists in the principal
case, and the court distinctly holds that the writ may-indeed
must-issue to prevent the inferior court from exceeding the
limits set for it by law, and operates, not like an injunction,
on the parties, but on the court, and the judge and officers who
disregard it may be punished. From the holding comes the
latest principle enunciated by the Illinois Supreme Court as
to a writ of prohibition, that the circuit and superior courts
are the only ones having original jurisdiction to issue writs of
prohibition; and that such power does not depend upon the
power to review judgments of the other court for the writ
does not have to be, as before believed, in aid of appellate
jurisdiction. The court said that the Superior Court erred in
refusing to issue the writ as petitioned, since Judge Green was
powerless to investigate the taxicab monopoly situation. Such
investigation could in no way have any bearing upon the question of petitioners' obstruction of justice in the Municipal
Court. In fact, there was no basis for any charge of obstruction of justice.
HELEN

W. MUNSERT

PowER OF DISPOSAL.
recent West Virginia case of Hustead v. Murray' presents

ENLARGEMENT OF LIFE ESTATE TO FEE BY

-The

9 169 I1. 201, 48 N. E. 717 (1897).
10347 Ill. 34, 179 N. E. 441 (1932).
1177 S. E. (W. Va.) 898 (1935).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

anew the perplexing problem of the enlargement of a life estate
to a fee by means of powers of disposal given the life tenant.
In that case, the language of the will was as follows: "I give,
devise and bequeath to my wife, Rosalie Hustead, all of my
property, both personal property and real estate, of which I
may die seized and possessed, she to have the right and privilege
to use, sell or dispose of the same as she may see fit during her
lifetime, but any personal property or real estate remaining at
her death shall by this will become the property of my daughter, Ada M. Hustead." The court held that Rosalie took the
property in fee simple, and that the devisee under her will took
title to the exclusion of the daughter, the present complainant.
The court admits that the decision is clearly against
2 the weight
of authority but feels bound by its own precedents.
The almost universal rule is that a life estate expressly created
by will is not converted into a fee merely because a power of
disposal is given the life tenant.8 Perhaps the most persuasive
decision, although one dealing solely with personalty, is the
United States Supreme Court case of Smith v. Bel,4 in which the
opinion is written by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall. The will in
that case contained the following language: "I give to my wife,
Elizabeth Goodwin, all my personal estate whatsoever and
wheresoever, and of what nature, kind and quality soever, after
payment of my debts, legacies, and funeral expenses; which
personal estate I give and bequeath unto my said wife, Elizabeth
Goodwin, to and for her own use and benefit and disposal absolutely; the remainder of said estate after her decease, to be for
The court pointed out
the use of the said Jesse Goodwin."
the impracticability of Procrustean rules of construction, declared that the cardinal rule should be to give effect to the
intent of the testator, and asserted that here the intention of the
testator was clear, and, might be given effect without contravening any positive rule of law. The court held that the later
words might limit the apparent scope of the gift, and that the
son took a vested remainder in the property.
2 The court points out that Virginia and West Virginia, both of whom have
adhered to the minority rule, have recently passed statutes bringing them into
conformity with the majority doctrine, and comments further: "It is to be
hoped that it may be the means of freeing the courts of the state from
adherence to an ancient rule, the effect of which is to defeat in part the
apparent purpose of the testator."
8 Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267 (1872); Melton v. Camp, 121 Ga. 693,
49 S. E. 690 (1905); Farlin v. Sanborn, 161 Mich. 615, 126 N. W. 634, 137
Am. St. Rep. 525 (1910); Mansfield v. Shelton, 67 Conn. 390, 35 A. 271,
52 Am. St. Rep. 285 (1896); Chase v. Ladd, 153 Mass. 126, 26 N. E. 429, 25
Am. St. Rep. 614 (1891); Perkinson v. Clarke, 135 Wis. 584, 116 N. W. 229
(1908).
431 U. S. 68, 8 L. Ed. 322 (1832).
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The cases upon the subject are so endless in number and the
wills construed so infinitely varied in phraseology that it is
impossible here to consider them all. It may be of interest, however, to review a few typical Illinois cases.
In Ducker v. Burnham5 the language of the will was: "I give,
bequeath and devise to my wife . . . the use of all the rest of
my real and personal estate for and during her natural life,
and I hereby give her full power and authority to sell, dispose
of, and convey any and all of said real and personal estate, and
to invest the proceeds thereof in any other form she deems
advisable, and I give her full right and authority to use and
exhaust such part of the principal of my estate, real and personal, as she may at any time think necessary for her support
and maintenance." After the death of the wife the property
then remaining was to be equally divided among the testator's
children. It was held that a life estate was created, which was
not increased to a fee by the power of disposal.
In Wardner v. Seventh Day Baptist Memorial Board6 it was
decided that the words "use, dispose of and control according
to her own judgment during her natural life" did not give the
devisee the power to sell and dispose of the fee in the property,
there being a limitation over after the death of the devisee. The
court said: "It is a general rule in all cases where by the terms
of the will there has been an express limitation of an estate to
the first taker for life and a limitation over, with general expressions apparently giving the tenant for life an unlimited
power over the estate, but which do not in express terms do so,
that the power of disposal is only coextensive with the estate
which the devisee takes under the will, and means such a disposal as the tenant for life could make, unless there are other
words clearly showing that a larger estate was intended."
In Smith v. Windsor,7 a devise of all of testator's real and
personal property to his wife "for and during her natural life
with full and complete power to sell and convey all or any part
thereof, or to loan the same, or to use and employ the same,
or any part thereof, in any other way she shall desire for her
comfort or advantage," with remainder to his heirs at law, was
held to give the widow only a life estate in the property of the
deceased, with a limited power to dispose of the fee in the
property.
In the very recent case of The Rock Island Bank and Trust
Company v. Rhoads," where the testator had no children, his
5 146
6232
7 239
8353

11.
Ill.
I1.
fll.

9, 34 N. E. 558, 37 Am. St. Rep. 135 (1893).
606, 83 N. E. 1077, 122 Am. St. Rep. 138 (1908).
567, 88 N. E. 482 (1909).
131, 187 N. E. 139 (1933).
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will read in part: "All the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both real, personal and mixed and wheresoever situate,
I give, devise and bequeath unto my well-beloved wife, Mary E.
Robinson to have and to hold the same unto her for and during
her natural life, with full authority to use and dispose of so
much of the same as may in her judgment be necessary for her
comfort and satisfaction in life." The will also gave to the
wife "full and exclusive management ... with power to invest,"
power from time to time to "sell and dispose absolutely of any,
every, and all of the real estate," etc.
Under this will, the court sustained gifts over to various
charitable institutions, and held that she could not dispose of
the property by will. The court did, however, sanction large
gifts and donations which she had made from the corpus of the
estate to various religious and charitable institutions. "The only
limitation on that power of disposal was that such disposal be,
in her judgment, necessary for her comfort and satisfaction in
life. Within the power of disposal, she, alone, was to determine
what was necessary for her comfort and satisfaction in life. 9
Mr. Justice Stone refnunciates the general rule applicable to
this class of cases: "It is a rule long followed and frequently
announced in this State, that a life estate may be created with
power to dispose of the fee; that by the same instrument there
may be created a limitation of the remainder after the termination of the life estate, and that such power of absolute disposition annexed to a life estate does not enlarge that estate into an
estate in fee."
G. S. STANSELL
PRESUMPTION

OF MALICE UNDER A GENERAL VERDICT.-In an

action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation,
Mrs. Nottingham recovered a judgment against Mrs. Blacklidge,
and, the defendant refusing to pay, a capias ad satisfaciendum
issued upon the judgment and Mrs. Blacklidge was imprisoned
in the county jail. She sought to be released under the provisions
of the Insolvent Debtors Act.' Her release was denied on the
ground that the judgment was recovered in an action of which
malice was the gist and that the petitioner had failed to show
that malice was, in fact, not the gist. The declaration in the
9 The Massachusetts court uses similar language in Dana v. Dana, 185 Mass.
156, 70 N. E. 49 (1904): "If through reasons of religion or of benevolence and
for her mental satisfaction she chose to devote any part of the estate left to
her in aid of either charitable or philanthropic objects, there is nothing in
the terms of his will that restricts her from making such use of the principle.
If the testator did not care to confine her discretionary powers there is no
duty incumbent on us to seek for reasons to limit their exercise."
1 In re Petition of Blacklidge, 359 fI1. 482 (1935).
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original action was made up of two counts, alienation of affections and criminal conversation, both charging malice; but
malice was the gist of only one of them, the count for alienation
of affections. In this regard, the court said that the "gist of the
action" constitutes the essential ground or object of a suit,
without which there is not a cause of action. The verdict returned was a general verdict. Interestingly enough, the court
held citing Buck v. Alex 2 and Jernberg v. Mix, 3 that a presumption was raised that the verdict was based on the cause of action
of which malice was the gist. Such a presumption is not conclusive, however, for the petitioner under section 2 of the
Insolvent Debtors Act 4 has the privilege of showing that the
verdict was in fact based upon a count of which malice was not
the gist. In the present case Mrs. Blacklidge failed to produce
any evidence at all for the purpose of making such a showing,
and therefore the court very rightly held that she had not
brought herself within the provisions of the Insolvent Debtors
Act and that she should not be released.
The dissenting opinion of Justices Shaw and Herrick is built
chiefly around two Illinois cases, Buck v. Alex 5 and People v.
LaMothe.6 In the Buck case this statement was made: "The
presumption is that the verdict and judgment are based upon
a cause of action of which malice is the gist and that the
defendant cannot be released from imprisonment under a capias
ad satisfaciendum under the Insolvent Debtors Act." In the
LaMothe case, in connection with the question of imprisonment
for debt under the constitution, section 12 of article 2,7 the court
stated that in the enforcement of this provision every doubt
should be resolved in favor of the liberty of the citizen. Clearly,
as stated by Justice Shaw, these two views are not in harmony,
and it was therefore necessary to determine which view should
be upheld. The dissenting opinion then went on to review the
decisions of other states in regard to presumptions of this
nature and concluded with this statement: "I feel that the more
2350 Ill.
167, 182 N. E. 794 (1933).
3 199 111. 254, 65 N. E. 242 (1902).
4 Cahilrs Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 72, par. 5: "When any person is arrested
or imprisoned upon any process issued for the purpose of holding such person to
bail upon any indebtedness, or in any civil action when malice is not the gist
of the action, or when any debtor is surrendered or committed to custody by
his bail in any such action, or is arrested or imprisoned upon execution in any
such action, such person may be released from such arrest or imprisonment
upon complying with the provisions of this act."
5 350 Ill. 167, 182 N. E. 794 (1933).
6 331 Ill.
351, 163 N. E. 6 (1928).
7 "No person shall be imprisoned for debt, unless upon refusal to deliver
up his estate for the benefit of his creditors, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law, or in cases where there is strong presumption of fraud."
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humane rule, as well as the weight of authority, is in accordance
with our expression in People v. LaMothe, supra, that all presumptions should be indulged in favor of the liberty of a citizen,
and that when the record is left in doubt we should not presume
that the verdict was based upon a count of which malice was
the gist." This dissenting opinion seems to have ignored the
fact that the presumption raised by the majority of the court
was only a prima facie one.
In the instant case, therefore, the decision is absolutely sound
according to the Illinois statutes. Since the presumption of
malice is only prima facie, the petitioner had the right under
the Insolvent Debtors Act to rebut it by competent evidence.
Failing to do so and thus failing to bring herself within the
relief afforded by the statute, her petition for a release was
rightly denied.
G. E. HALL
IS PRIVITY BETWEEN CLAIMANTS STILL REQUISITE TO A BILL
OF INTERPLEADER.?-In the recent case of Camden Safe Deposit

and Trust Company v. Barber,' the New Jersey Court of Errors
and Appeals decided that privity is no longer necessary. In this
case, the plaintiff bank was the depositary of certain dividend
checks, endorsed to them by one of the claimants, the wife of
deceased, who was acting under a power of attorney. The other
claimants were the judgment creditors of the deceased, who
had levied on the deposit, and the administrator. The court
admitted that the claims were each paramount and adverse, but
stated that this fact did not preclude a bill of interpleader in
New Jersey.
This decision is directly in line with previous interpleader
cases in New Jersey,2 and is certainly nothing new in the law.
However, it does suggest the question, What has happened to
the doctrine of privity in Illinois?
In discussing this, it is first necessary to define interpleader
and determine what its requisites originally were. Pomeroy, in
his treatise on Equity Jurisprudence,3 states: "Where two or
more persons whose titles are connected by reason of one being
derived from the other, or of both being derived from a common
source, claim the same thing, debt, or duty, by different or separate interests, from a third person, and he, not knowing to
which of the claimants he ought of right to render the debt or
duty, or to deliver the thing, fears he may be hurt by some of
1176 A. 313 (1935).
2 Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Biddle, 112 N. J. Eq. 397, 164 A. 583 (1933)

Blair v. Porter, 13 N. J. Eq. 267 (1861).
3 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence 343.
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them, he may maintain a suit and obtain against them the
remedy of interpleader. To sustain the suit, four requisites are
necessary: First, the same thing, debt or duty . . . Second,
privity between the opposing claimants . . . Third, plaintiff a
mere stakeholder and . .. Fourth, no independent liability to
one of the claimants." In discussing the second requisite,
privity, Pomeroy says: "Where there is no privity between the
claimants, where their titles are independent, not derived from
a common source, but each asserted as wholly paramount to the
other, the stakeholder is obliged . . .to defend himself as well
as he can against each ... ." This principle was integrated into
the early English law as a result of the cases in which a tenant
attempted to interplead his landlord and another claiming adverse and paramount title, and in which a bailee interpleaded
his principal and an adverse paramount claimant.4 But it was
subsequently decided that if the property actually belonged to
another, the bailee might safely deny his bailor's title.'
This subsequent decision seemed to remove the very foundation upon which the doctrine rested, but the technical requisites
had been laid down and the courts continued to restate them,
not, however, without frequent criticism from both judges and
writers on the subject. 6 Thus, in England, by the Common Law
Procedure Act of 1860, privity is no longer required.7 By statute, in this country, many states have abolished it.s In those
states where no statute has been enacted, the question continues
to arise. New Jersey has solved it by judicial legislation. The
Illinois cases seem to have solved it as effectively without expressly abrogating the rule.
Walsh, one of the critics of this doctrine, on page 565 of his
Treatise on Equity, states: "Another technicality which, however, has not even the excuse of mere logic .. .arises from the
supposed rule that there must be 'privity' between the claimants,
their title being derived from a common source, so that where
the title of each is wholly distinct and independent of the other,
interpleader can not be had." The author then points out that
in each case equitable relief is just as necessary, that in each,
the plaintiff is ready to pay the successful claimant exactly
what he is entitled to, that the real controversy is between the
4 Pearson v. Cardon, 2 Russ. & My. 606, 39 Eng. Rep. 525 (1833); Crawshoy v. 'Thornton, 2 My. & Cr. 1, 40 Eng. Rep. 541 (1837); 3 Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence 348, footnote 1.
5Biddle v. Bank, 6 B. & S. 225, 122 Eng. Rep. 1179 (1865).
6 Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, II, 28; Walsh, A Treatise on
Equity, p. 565.
7 Attenborough v. London, etc. Dock Co., L. R. 3 C. P. Div. 450 (1878)'.
8 33 C. J. 421, footnote 37.
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claimants, and it is thus unfair that the plaintiff should be
subjected to liability, litigation and annoyance. He then states
that many courts have refused to recognize privity, and as one
of the cases supporting this statement, he cites an Illinois case,
The Platte Valley State Bank v. The National Live Stock Bank.'
A study of this case, and its relation to the cases following,
will show the Illinois doctrine. In this case, one Halsey deposited
with the plaintiff bank the sum of $5,983.18 to be credited to
the Platte bank and to be remitted to that bank upon presentation of a draft to be drawn upon it. The plaintiff sent notice to
the Platte bank of this deposit, but before the latter had drawn
upon the plaintiff bank, the Union Stock Yards Bank of South
Omaha made known to the plaintiff that it claimed the said
fund, under a chattel mortgage given by Halsey upon cattle
sold in Chicago. In making its decision, the court quoted Pomeroy and laid down as necessary to a bill of interpleader in
Illinois the four requisites he enumerates. But in determining
the question of privity, they did not demand that the claimants
have a dependent title in the sense of one being derived from
the other. It was held sufficient that both claimed under Halsey,
and that thus both claims were derived from a common source.
Since this case was decided in 1895, practically all cases in
interpleader in Illinois have cited it as authority, not, however,
for the apparent extension of the rule of privity, but as
authority for demanding that the four requisites be maintained.10
In actual practice, though, the courts have maintained the liberal
attitude established in that case. Thus in Fidelity Fire Insurance Company v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank,1 the
plaintiff bank held a fund arising from the business of an insurance company as conducted by its agents, and in which the
bank claimed no interest. The insurance company demanded
payment on the account, while the agents threatened to hold
the bank liable to them if such payment were made. After
determining that there was no independent liability to the insurance company, the court allowed interpleader, holding that
it was not controlling that the claim of the agents was for
damages for an alleged breach of contract.
Another case in which the doctrine was even more liberally
9 155 111. 250, 40 N. E. 621 (1895).
10 Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 110 Ill. App. 92
(1903); Snow v. Ulrich, 126 Ill. App. 493 (1906) ; Peterson v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., 111 111. App. 466 (1903) ; Noble v. Carruthers, 235 Ill. App. 1
(1924) ; Supreme Council of the W. C. U. v. Morris, 154 Ill. App. 465 (1910) ;
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Ostrom, 274 Ill. App. 241 (1934) ; Rauch v. Ft. Dearborn
National Bank, 223 Ill. 507, 79 N. E. 273 (1906); Chicago Title & Trust Co.
v. DeLassey, 336 M. 522, 168 N. E. 640 (1929).
11 110 Ill. App. 92 (1903_.

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

applied was that of Noble v. Carruthers.12 There the plaintiff
had made contracts with each of two defendants, agreeing to
pay a specified sum if either secured a tenant for the plaintiff's
building. A tenant was procured and both defendants claimed
the fund. The court determined from the facts that there was
no independent liability, thus distinguishing the case from that
3
With respect to the question of privity,
of Sachsel v. Farrer.'
the court found that the tenant, credit for finding whom was
claimed by both, was a "common source" sufficient to fulfill
such requisite. In concluding the opinion, Justice Taylor said:
" . . . and it is true that in early history of the law as it pertains
strictly to bills of interpleader such a situation as exists would
not give a court of equity jurisdiction. But the tendency of the
law seems to be more and more towards allowing bills in the
nature of bills of interpleader wherever there are conflicting
claims, made by several against one, which grew out of a single
transaction and which may be determined with better justice
in one suit in equity than in several suits at law." Justice
Thompson, in a concurring opinion, in answer to the question
of privity raised by the defendants, said: "There need not be
[privity] in order to make out a proper case for interpleader."
He then stated that the privity referred to as essential in Platte
Valley National Bank v. The Live Stock National Bank, does
not require a derivative title between adverse claimants but
merely that both claimants can find a "common source."
In Illinois, then, it seems that privity in name is still demanded
as an essential element of interpleader, 14 but in actual practice,
through the application of the words "common source," the
courts have circumvented the strict technical meaning as required in the early law and thus solved the problem in this
state.
R. L. HUFF
WHAT CONSTITUTES NOTICE OF AN INFIRMITY IN THE TITLE OF
A VENDOR OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER ?-The Circuit Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit recently handed down a decision in
White-Phillips Company, Inc. v. Graham,' as to what constitutes an infirmity in the title of a vendee of negotiable paper
under the Negotiable Instruments Law as it exists in Illinois.
The conclusion of the court is not startling, since there is adequate authority to support it. It is particularly interesting,
however, to those who follow Illinois law, since it is but the
12

235 Ill. App. 1 (1924).
Ill. App. 277 (1889).
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Prudential Insurance Co. v. Ostrom, 274 Iil. App. 241 (1934).
174 F. (2d) 417 (1935).
14
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2
second reported decision interpreting this section of the statute.
The first Northwestern National Bank v. Madison & Kedzie State
Bank,$ was a decision of the Illinois Appellate Court. There the
court arrived at a conclusion opposite to that of the Circuit
Court of Appeals.
Better to understand the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals, it is well to consider first, the Appellate Court case.
The Northwestern National Bank had a number of bonds stolen
from it. The customary notice of theft was circulated among
other companies dealing in bonds, and such notice was mailed
to the Madison-Kedzie Bank and received by an agent authorized to receive and open the mail. Subsequently the stolen bonds
were purchased by an agent of the Madison-Kedzie Bank acting
in good faith and without actual knowledge of the theft and at
full value. The Northwestern National Bank brought an action
for the conversion of the bonds. In that case the court said:
"In our opinion notice depends upon the authority of the
agent to acquire it through the opening and inspecting of
the bank's mail and not upon the duty to report it to the
agents of the bank. If there was neglect in that respect on
his part, it did not change the fact that notice was received
by an agent of the bank authorized to receive the knowledge
and to deal with it. If to constitute actual knowledge of the
bank, it would be necessary to bring such notice to the actual
attention of each of its several agents likely to deal with such
securities, then it would open the door to easy evasion of liability and put a premium on the negotiation of stolen securities.
The notice having been received by the proper agent of the
bank to receive, open, and acknowledge its mail in the line of
his duties, we think the bank is estopped from claiming it did
not have actual knowledge of the defect in the title of the
bonds subsequently received."
In White-Phillips Company, Inc. v. Graham, the court was
faced with a similar set of facts. On or about September 2, 1930,
certain Illinois State Highway bonds were stolen from a safe
in the home of one Graham. He immediately gave notice of the
theft to the Foreman State Corporation and others, Pursuant
to its custom, the Foreman Company mailed a report of this
theft to a list of municipal bond dealers about September 5.
White-Phillips Company, the appellant in this case, was a
dealer in municipal bonds and received the said notice. Sub2 Cahills 11.. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 98, sec. 76: "To constitute notice of an
infirmity in the instrument or defect in title of the person negotiating the
same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of
the infirmity or defect or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking
the instrument amounted to bad faith."
8242 Ill. App. 22 (1926).
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sequent to the receipt of the notice, J. A. Gonley of Saint Paul
wrote to the appellant on September 13, 1930, and asked for
bids for eight Illinois Highway bonds of certain maturity dates.
On the 16th the appellant wired a bid which was promptly
accepted. The bonds were shipped accompanied by a sight draft,
which was paid by the appellant. After receipt of the bonds,
one of the employees observed that the serial numbers on the
bonds corresponded with the numbers on the theft notice.
It was not questioned that the bonds were purchased before
maturity, that the full market value had been paid, or that the
negotiating agent had no knowledge of the theft at the time of
the purchase.
The treasurer of the State of Illinois, not knowing who was
entitled to be paid for the bonds, filed a bill of interpleader,
wherein the bond company and the larceny victim were made
parties defendant. In the district court the latter based his
case on Northwestern National Bank v. Madison & Kedzie State
Bank, before cited. The decree was in favor of the larceny victim and the bond company appealed to the Circuit Court.
The court said that a holding of the Illinois Supreme Court,
if any existed, would govern in this decision. It did not feel,
however, that a denial of a writ of certiorari by the Supreme
Court amounted to a decision by it. It, therefore, felt free to
apply the law as it interpreted it to be in the light of general
state and Federal decisions.
The court intimated that the Northwestern National Bank v.
Madison & Kedzie State Bank was an isolated case which stood
alone without authority to support it, and then cited cases to
substantiate their opinion that, upon the above set of facts,
the appellant bond company had good title to the bonds.
Rapheal v. Bank of England4 was a suit on a note stolen from
Shipley and Company in Liverpool. Notices of the theft were
widely circulated and it was found in a special verdict that
St. Paul and Company in Paris, who purchased the note, had
received notice of the robbery, but at the time of the sale, the
purchasing agent had no knowledge of the fact, although he
had means at his disposal of ascertaining that it had been
stolen. The court held that St. Paul and Company was a bona
fide purchaser and acquired good title to the paper.
In Vermilye and Company v. Adams Express Company,5 the
United States Supreme Court said: "By the well established law
of the case they [bankers] may purchase such paper before due
without cumbering their minds or their offices with the memoranda of such notices."
4 17 C. B. 161, 139 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1892).

521 Wall. 138, 22 L. Ed. 609 (1874).
Accord: Goodman v. Simonds, 20
How. 243, 15 L. Ed. 934; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110, 17 L. Ed. 857.
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In Merchants National Bank v. Detroit Trust Company,6 a
notice that the bonds had been stolen was received by the bank's
mailing clerk, but the officers of the company who had charge of
the purchases denied they had received or had been made acquainted with the contents of the notice. The Supreme Court of
Michigan said, in referring to the decision in the case of
Northwestern National Bank v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank:
"So far as we can determine, this case stands alone. It estops
the purchaser from showing good faith at the time the bonds
were acquired. It makes notice of the theft exclusive evidence
of mala tides. It overlooks the established rule, that one who receives actual notice, if by the forgetfulness or negligence he does
not have it in mind when he acquires the bonds, he may still be
a good faith purchaser."
The decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, however, is not7
without authority. German-American National Bank v. Kelly,
decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa, was a suit on a note
made by the defendant. The defense was that the bank acquired
the paper with knowledge that the note was procured by fraud.
The bank proved that the cashier who purchased the note took
it in good faith. The jury found for the defendant, and the bank
appealed on the ground that the court should have been instructed to find for the plaintiff. In affirming the judgment
the court said: "...
such knowledge might have reached the
bank through the president, or the assistant cashier, both of
whom were dealing actively with the public in behalf of the
bank, and no evidence negativing the possession of such knowledge by these officers was adduced."
In Harter v. Peoples Bank,8 decided by the Supreme Court of
New York, it was held that if the bank's manager had notice
or knowledge that the transaction was unlawful, and did not
act in good faith, his bad faith was imputable to the bank.
The cases supporting the contention that a bank can acquire
good title to negotiable paper where notice of its theft has been
received by it, are the majority. They seem to lose sight, however, of the fact that a corporation must deal solely through its
agents, and of the principle of agency that notice to the agent
is notice to his principal. As pointed out in the Restatement of
the Law-Agency, 9 "Notification given to an agent is notice to
the principal if given to an agent authorized to receive it." It
is laid down in Story on Agency10 that "notice of facts to an
6258 Mich. 526, 242 N. W. 739 (1932).
7 183 Iowa 269, 166 N. W. 1053 (1918).
8221 App. Div. 122, 223 N. Y. S. 118 (1927).
9 Sec. 168.
10 Sec. 140.

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

agent is constructive notice thereof to the principal himself,
where it arises from, or at the time connected with, the subject
matter of the agency; for, upon general principles of public
policy, it is presumed that the agent has communicated the facts
to his principal; and that if he has not, still the principal having
entrusted the agent with the particular business, the other party
has the right to deem the acts and knowledge obligatory on his
principal."
The decision of Northwestern National Bank v. Madison &
Kedzie State Bank, from a standpoint of reason and principle,
seems the more logical conclusion.
W. R. MACMIhLAN
EFFECT OF MARRIED WOMAN's ACTS ON ESTATES BY THE EN-

TIRETY.-With the advent of married woman's acts in the
United States and England, courts have been forced to consider
what effect such legislation has had upon the common law estate
by the entirety. Some jurisdictions have held that this type of
estate has been abolished; others, that it is still possible of creation; while still others have created it by express statute.
Pennsylvania, in the case of Benski v. American Alliance Insurance Company of New York,' decided indirectly that the
estate was still possible of creation. However, the court treated
the case more from the standpoint of insurance than of property.
The parties admitted by their pleadings that the estate held by
husband and wife was one by the entirety. The express language
of the deed of conveyance to the husband and wife was not
before the court, and it is difficult, therefore, to determine what
words Pennsylvania would recognize as creating such an estate.
Other cases indicate, however, that the law in Pennsylvania is
not settled as to what language is actually necessary to create the
estate. In the case of Hoover v. Potter,2 the question to be
decided was whether a devise or grant to "John N. Beecher and
Annie, his wife, as tenants in common" created an estate by
entirety or an estate as tenants in common. The court held that
the purpose of the Married Woman's Act 3 was to protect the
wife's property by removing it from the husband's dominion;
that it was not the intent to destroy the unity of husband and
wife, but, to secure to the wife property which she owned at
the time of the marriage or which accrued to her thereafter.
1176 A.-205 (1935).
242 Penn. Sup. Ct. 21.
8 Pa. Stat., par. 14569: "Hereafter a married woman shall have the same
right and power as an unmarried person to acquire, own, possess, control, use,
lease, sell, or otherwise dispose of any property of any kind real, personal,
or mixed, and either in possession or expectancy, and may exercise the said
right and power in the same manner and to the same extent as an unmarried
person, but she may not mortgage or convey her real property unless her
husband join in such mortgage or conveyance."
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It was not the intent of the act to affect the estates known to
the common law, but only to secure to the wife added rights. As
to the language necessary to create the estate, the court relied
upon In re Young's Estate4 and held that a conveyance to husband and wife as such, whether they were described in the
deed as tenants in common or joint tenants, vested in them an
estate by the entirety. These cases, however, have been criticized. Most authorities would regard the language used in the
Pennsylvania cases as creating a mere tenancy in common,
although a deed to husband and wife, without further qualification, would create an estate by the entirety.
In the case of Godman v. Greer,5 a Delaware case, the court
held that the purpose of the Married Woman's Act was remedial
only and that the act did not attempt to destroy the oneness of
husband and wife, but simply protected the wife's separate property by removing it from the control of the husband. The language of the conveyance in the Delaware case was the same as
that in the Pennsylvania cases, but the Delaware court held that
a tenancy in common was created.
North Carolina, in the case of First National Bank of Durham
v. thall,6 held that a deed to a husband and wife, unless it required them to hold by another character of tenancy, conveyed
to them the common law estate by entirety; and that the constitutional provisions relating to married women and the statutes enacted in7 pursuance thereto made no change in this common law estate.
In Goodrich v. Village of Otega,s New York held that estates
by the entirety were still recognized in that jurisdiction. The
question raised in that case was whether a wife had to join with
her husband to convey the estate by the entirety. At common
law, both parties had to execute the deed in order to pass the
estate. The court ruled that the harsh principles of common law,
which destroyed for most purposes the legal identity of the wife
and subjected her person to the control of her husband, were not
incidents to the tenancy by the entirety and have long been detached from that estate by reason of the Married Woman's Act.9
4 166 Pa. St. 645, 31 A. 373 (1895).
5 12 Del. Ch. 397, 105 A. 380 (1918).

6201 N. C. 787, 161 S. E. 484 (1931).
7 Const. Art. 10, par. 6 of the North Carolina Code: "The real and personal
property of any kind of any female in this state acquired before marriage and
all property to which she may after marriage become possessed shall be and
remain the sole property of such female, and shall not be liable for the debts,
obligations, or engagements of her husband and may be devised and bequeathed with the written assent of her husband."
8216 N. Y. 114, 110 N. E. 162 (1915).
9 Ch. 14, par. 50 and 51. The married woman has the general rights of distribution and sale, right to profit, etc. She may contract with her husband also.
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The husband was held to be a tenant in common with the right
of survivorship; likewise the wife; an award to the husband
was held not to bind the wife; however, either party was held
entitled to alienate his life interest. Therefore, it will be noticed,
the only incident still extant in the estate by the entirety in New
York is survivorship.
In Oklahoma, a deed to husband and wife creates an estate by
1
the entirety. It was decided in the case of Clay v. Robertson "
that the Married Woman's Act applied only to the separate
property of the wife and did not affect the joint interests of
husband and wife in an estate by the entirety. The act merely
intended to preserve the estate of the wife from liability for
the debts of the husband.
In the case of Appeal of Robinson," the Maine courts held
that a devise to "my son-in-law, J. Robinson, and my daughter,
0., his wife" created an estate in common, since tenancy by
the entirety was destroyed by the Married Woman's Act. 12 The
court held that the unity of husband and wife was destroyed by
the statute, since such a conception was repugnant to the American idea of the enjoyment and devolution of property; that
since the fictitious basis of the unity of husband and wife had
been removed, and the basis for the rule in an estate by the
entirety had been destroyed, the rule itself failed.
In the Tennessee decision of Gill v. McKinney, 13 a deed to
Gill and his wife was made in 1914. The Married Woman's Act
was passed in 1913.14 The court, in construing the act, held that
1030 Okla. 758, 120 P. 1102 (1912).
1188 Me. 17, 33 A. 652 (1895).
12 Rev. Stat. of Me., Ch. 74, sec. 1, (Act of 1844). "A married woman of
any age may own in her own right real or personal estate acquired by descent,
gift, or purchase, and may sell, convey and devise the same by will without
the joinder or assent of her husband, but such conveyance without the joinder
or assent of the husband shall not bar his right and interest by descent in
the estate so conveyed. Real estate directly conveyed to her by her husband,
cannot be conveyed by her without the joinder of her husband, except real
estate conveyed to her as security or in payment of a bona fide debt
actually due to her from her husband. Where payment was made for property
conveyed to her from the property of her husband, or it was conveyed by
him to her without a valuable consideration, it may be taken as the property
of her husband to pay his debts contracted before such purchase."
18 140 Tenn. 549, 205 S. W. 416 (1918).
14 Act of 1913, 8460, Tenn. Code: "That women be, and are, hereby duly
emancipated from all disabilities on account of coverture and the common
law as to disabilities of married women and its effect on the rights of the
wife is totally abrogated and marriage shall not impose any disabilities or
incapacities on a woman as to the ownership, acquisition, or disposition of
property of any sort, or as to her capacity to make contracts and do all
acts in reference to her property which she could lawfully do if she were not
married, but every woman now married, or hereafter to be married shall have
the same capacity to acquire, hold, manage, control, use, enjoy, and dispose
of all property real or personal in possession, and to make any contract in
reference to it, and to sue and be sued."
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it was the intent of the legislature to abolish estates by the
entirety; that the estate was created at common law because of
the disability of a married woman to hold and dispose of property; that since, however, the statute had given her full powers
of disposition, the reason for the rule had failed and the estate
could not be created. Such was the condition of the law in Tennessee until 1919, when the legislature by express statute revived
the estate by the entirety.
In the Wisconsin case of Wallace v. St. John15 it was stated
that estates by the entirety were abolished. The court held that,
although after the Married Woman's Act 6 of 1850 an estate by
the entirety could still be created in Wisconsin, the amendment
of 187817 so far removed the disabilities of married women that
the estate by the entirety was abolished.
In In re Ray's Will'8 there was a conveyance to "Charles Ray
and Jennie Ray, his wife, as tenants by the entireties." The
court, citing as its authority the case of Wallace v. St. John,
stated that the husband and wife took an estate as tenants in
common. In this case, it will be noted that express language
was used. Despite this fact, the court held that estates by the
entirety arose not because of the form of the conveyance but
because of the status of the grantees. Regarding this point, it
was stated in Morris v. McCarty'9 that a conveyance to two
grantees expressly limited to hold as tenants by the entirety was
ineffective to create the estate by the entirety, because the
grantees were not in fact married; that the provisions of the
Married Woman's Act2 0 have served to destroy the common law
basis for the estate; that under the statute, the feme covert had
the power to convey her interest; and that that power, accompanied by other rights of emancipation, reduces what would be
an estate by the entirety to a mere joint tenancy.
In Illinois, it still remains a moot question whether or not
the estate can be created since the passage of the Married
Woman's Acts of 1861, 1869 and 1874.21 In the case of Park
15 119 Wis. 585, 97 N. W. 197 (1903).
16 Act of 1850, Ch. 44, Wis. Code, providing that a wife could receive or
inherit by gift, grant, devise, or bequest from any person other than her husband and hold the same to her sole and separate use and convey and devise
in the same manner as if she were unmarried.
17Act of 1878, of Property Rights of Married Women, Wis. Code, par.
246.01: "The real estate of every description, including all held in joint
tenancy with her husband, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof, of any
female now married shall not be subject to the disposition of her husband,
but shall be her sole and separate property as if she were unmarried."
Is 188 Wis. 180, 205 N. W. 917 (1925).
19 158 Mass. 11, 32 N. E. 938 (1893).
20 Same as Act of 1878.
21 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 30, pars. 17, 18.
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Commissioners v. Coleman,22 a conveyance was made in 1855 to
Henry Johnson and Nancy Johnson, his wife, and Mary Ann
Johnson, his daughter, under which the family took possession.
The court held that the husband and wife became seized of an
estate by the entirety in half, and the daughter was seized in fee
of the other half as tenant in common with her parents.
Mittel v. Karl,23 another Illinois case, involved a conveyance
to "Maria Jobst and Michael Jobst, her husband, and the survivor of them in her or his own right." The appellees claimed
as tenants in common, while appellants claimed the entire estate
as tenants by the entirety. The court stated that the estate by
the entirety no longer existed in this state; that, although before
the legislature passed the Married Woman's Acts a conveyance
to husband and wife was a tenancy by the entirety, the act of
1861 conferred upon married women the right to acquire property and hold and enjoy it free from the husband's control; and
that the estate created- here was a tenancy in common.
The Illinois case usually cited as authoritative is Cooper v.
Cooper,24 where it is stated that the common law estate by the
entirety was abolished with the adoption of the Married Woman's
Act. The court said: "We are aware that this construction is
not in harmony with that given by the courts of some of the
states of the Union in construing their statutes .... But it may
be our statute is materially different from theirs. But if it is
not, still the tenor of our legislation has been broader and more
liberal on the subject than the legislation in those states, and
hence we, to effectuate the intention of our General Assembly,
should be more liberal; otherwise the courts would rather hinder
than carry out the intention of the law. The intention of a law
may be, to some extent, ascertained by subsequent legislation
on the subject. If, then, we look at all of our legislation on the
subject, we can entertain no doubt that the General Assembly
intended to remove all the fetters."
Illinois has never decided, however, whether an estate by the
22108 111. 591 (1884).
23 133 Ill. 65, 24 N. E. 553 (1890).
24 76 111. 57 (1875). In this case the granting clause was, "This indenture,
between Noah M. King and Jane King, his wife, . . . of the first part, and Win.
Cooper and Sarah Ann Cooper, and the heirs of her natural body ....
of the
second part: Witnesseth, that the said party of the first part . ...
have
granted, bargained, and sold, and by these presents do grant, bargain and
sell unto the said party of the second part, their heirs and assigns, all the
following." The court held that the husband and wife took each an undivided half in fee as tenants in common and that upon the husband's death
his portion went to his heirs at law; and that the words "heirs of her natural
body" must be rejected as surplusage, there being no apt words to limit an
estate to the heirs of the wife's body. The appellant's contention that an
estate by the entirety was created was overruled; such estate was said to have
been abolished in Illinois.
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entirety would be created in a case where the language of the
granting clause expressly provided for it. Those who state that
the estate may possibly be created base their arguments on the
fact that since the estate existed at common law, it will still
continue despite the emancipation of married women. They contend that the statutes are remedial and, therefore, create new
rights without removing any of the common law incidents of
marriage. Those who argue that the estate cannot be created
in any form, base their contentions on the fact that the existence
of the estate depends upon the status of the parties and that
the requisite status has been changed by the married woman's
acts. The possibility of creation of an estate by the entirety, then,
will depend upon the construction that the various courts place
upon the statutes in their respective jurisdictions.
W. J. J. WAHLER
How A GRANTEE ASSENTS TO THE CLAUSE IN A DEED BY WHICH

HE ASSUMES MORTGAGE.-The Illinois Appellate Court, in two
decisions' rendered this year, repeated rather ambiguous lan-2
guage from the Supreme Court opinion of Ludlum v. Pinckard.
One of these, Sebolt v. Verderevski et al.,8 undoubtedly rests on
sound law. In a mortgage foreclosure, the mortgagee sought a
deficiency decree against the mortgagor 's grantee, predicating
liability upon the deed of record by which the grantee assumed
and agreed to pay all encumbrances. A decree pro confesso
against the grantee was reversed in the Appellate Court upon
the ground that the complaint did not show that the defendant
actually assumed the encumbrance, inasmuch as it failed to aver
that he assented to the assumption clause. There was no allegation that he had accepted the deed, or had, himself, had it recorded, or had taken possession of the property.
Plainly, the only necessary conclusion of the court as a matter
of law was that the mortgagee must show an actual assumption of
the obligation by the grantee; that the deed by which he assumes
and agrees to pay is not of itself enough, but must be supplemented by some fact, however slight, indicating his assent.
This proposition is neither new nor doubtful. The Illinois
Supreme Court decision of Thompson v. Dearborn4 in 1883
rested upon it. That case was followed in three later Appellate
decisions 5 under substantially identical conditions. The Appel1 Sebolt v. Verderevski et al., 279 I1. App. 30 (1935) ; Freitag v. Buck,
279 Ill. App. 284 (1935).
2304 IIl. 449, 136 N. E. 725 (1922).
s279 Ill. App. 30 (1935).
4 107 Ill. 87 (1883).
5Baer v. Knewitz, 39 Ill. App. 470 (1891) ; Boisot v. Chandler, 82 Ill. App.
505 (1898); Kreidler v. Hyde, 120 Il1. App. 505 (1905).
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late Court characterized Thompson v. Dearborn as "somewhat
similar" to the principal case. It did not stop with this authority, but proceeded to fortify its position by quoting verbatim
this paragraph from Ludlum v. Pinckard: "An agreement on
the part of a grantee to pay incumbrances on property conveyed
must be based on sufficient consideration and the assumption
clause of the deed must be accepted and agreed to by the
grantee. The law requires something more than the mere insertion by the grantor of a clause in the deed that the grantee
assumes such incumbrance. The assumption of such incumbrance
is by way of contract or agreement on the part of the grantee,
and the grantee's assent to such contract must in some manner
appear. While the general rule is that if the grantee takes
and claims title under a deed he takes it by the terms of the deed,
yet in order that a grantee be held personally liable for payment
of an incumbrance against the property, it must be shown, in
addition to having accepted title to the property, that he assented
to the condition of the deed relating to the personal assumption of the debt. Unless it be shown that the grantee in a deed
has some reason to believe that the deed to him contained a personal contract on his part to pay a mortgage or other lien on
the property transferred, and that he assented thereto, he cannot be held, as a matter of law, to have assumed such
obligation. "6
One statement in this passage requires particular attention,
namely, that the grantee must have assented to the assumption
"in addition to having accepted title to the property." On its
face this assertion seems directly opposed to the doctrine pre8
vailing in most of the United States,7 including Illinois, that
perhim
a grantee's assumption of incumbrances by deed makes
sonally liable for the debt.
As authority for this statement, the court in the Ludlum case
cited Thompson v. Dearborn. But we have seen that that case,
and the ones following it, held only that the grantee must give
some indication of assent to the terms of the deed. Might not
'acceptance of title" indicate assent ?
9
Discussing the Thompson case, the court in Bay v. Williams
explained the reason for its doctrine: "In the absence of all
proof that Thompson assented to the execution of the deed, or
had ever ratified it in terms, or tacitly by receiving it, or in
some other manner, it was held that the bill failed to show a
liability-that to fix the liability of such a grantee it must appear
that he participated in its execution, or had knowledge that it
6304 11. 552, 136 N. E. 767 (1922).
7 See notes, 21 A. L. R. 439; 47 A. L. R. 339; and cases.
293 (1881).
8 Flagg v. Getmacher, 98 Ill.
91 (1884).
9 112 Ill.
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had been made or assented to, or in some manner approved or
ratified it; otherwise it would be in the power of the mortgagor,
of his own motion, without the knowledge and without the assent
of the grantee, to render anyone liable to pay the mortgage debt
by simply executing to him a deed containing such a clause, and
having it recorded in the proper office." Some fantastic litigation might appear in our courts if this state of affairs obtained.
But the court in Thompson v. Dearborn did not attempt to
stretch its decision beyond this reasonable ground. It said that
the grantee's assent must be shown, and then added: "This
might be done by showing that he signed and sealed the deed....
Or it might be shown that the deed was delivered to and accepted
by him." 10 Would the grantee, by performing one of these
acts, be doing something "in addition to having accepted title
to the property?" Or did the words used in Ludlum v. Pinckard
"having accepted title" mean something less than the acts themselves which would evidence acceptance of title?
This passage quoted from the Ludlum case came under consideration again in the late case of Freitag v. Buck." This was
another bill to foreclose, seeking also a decree setting aside a
release of record of a mortgage on the ground of fraud. The
complainant held the mortgage by assignment of the original
mortgagee. He had, however, failed to record his assignment.
The mortgagor and his grantees paid all of the interest and
principal to the complainant's assignor, who paid over the interest to the complainant, but absconded with the principal. The
last deed of conveyance, made to the defendant, contained a
clause by which the grantee assumed and agreed to pay the
mortgage.
The court stated the ground for its decision succinctly: "It
was the duty of appellant, if he wished to protect himself against
subsequent purchases and incumbrances without notice, to have
recorded his assignment of the mortgage. '"12 But it reached
this decision in the face of the Supreme Court's holding' 3 "that
the rule requiring the assignee of a mortgage . . . to give actual
or constructive notice, in order to protect himself against payments to the mortgagee, does not extend to subsequent purchasers of the property who assume and agree to pay the incumbrance.' ' 4 This holding, it regarded as "not controlling." It
certainly seems that defendant's payments on the mortgage
were evidence of his acceptance of the assumption clause, although he may not have known of its existence.
10 107 Ill. 93 (1883).
11279 Ill. App. 284 (1935).
12

Ibid., 294.

13

Schultz v. Sroelowitz, 191 Il1. 249, 61 N. E. 92 (1901).

14 279 Ill. App. 293 (1935).
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It will be noticed that the holding in the Ludlum case is consistent with the court's statement that assent as well as acceptance of
title must be shown in order to bind the grantee personally.
The grantee in Ludlum v. Pinckard had clearly accepted title,
and her payment of a thousand dollars on the mortgage showed
her assent. The payment was an act in addition to acceptance
of title.
The defendant in the case of Gage et al. v. Cameron15 never
even saw the deed which contained the assumption clause, but
his book-keeper accepted for his benefit, and followed the course
suggested by him. The court compelled him to discharge the
debt, and made this observation: "If he [the grantee] accepts
the instrument and places it upon record, such acceptance of
the deed with knowledge of its contents binds him as effectually as though the deed has been executed by him." Patently,
the acceptance and recording of the deed could be held to be
more than mere acceptance of title.
In Swisher v. Palmer,'6 in which the defendant had taken
title under a misconception of liability, merely as a conduit for
title, and subsequently, upon discovering his mistake, quitclaimed to the actual grantee, deficiency was decreed against
him because, while he would not have been liable without some
assent, his execution of the quit-claim deed under the circumstances, when he need have done nothing, amounted to assent,
even though at the time he reiterated his denial of liability. By
his deed the court held that he had acknowledged title in himself
under the deed which contained the assumption clause, and in
acknowledging title he assented to the clause.
In Dean v. Walker,1 7 the court ruled that a grantee who accepted a deed from a mortgagor containing an assumption
clause, and placed it upon record, was liable as principal upon
the bonds secured by the mortgage, and that the mortgagee could
recover against him. In each of the last three cases discussed,
the grantee had accepted the deed itself. By doing so he had
not only accepted title, but had taken it by the terms of the
deed.
In view of these decisions, and of the fact that the court had
cited Thompson v. Dearborn, and was fully aware of the limit
of its authority, and in view of its own final holding, the court,
in remarking in Ludlum v. Pinckard that assent as well as
acceptance of title must be shown in order to bind the grantee
personally, must not have considered acceptance of title as
equivalent to acceptance of the deed. The cases clearly indicate
that the grantee binds himself by accepting the deed.
C. E. Fox
15212 Ill. 146, 72 N. E. 204 (1904).
16 106 I. App. 432 (1902).
17 107 Il1. 540 (1883).
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WHEN A REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS IMPROPERLY FILED-ELEC-

TION NOT TO FILE-TIME FOR APPEAL AFTER ELECTION.-In the

recent case of West Side Trust and Savings Bank v. Samuel J.
Damond et al.,' the Appellate Court of the First District decided three points in relation to appellate practice under the
new Civil Practice Act and rules of court about which there
had been some confusion, uncertainty, and ambiguity. The points
decided were: first, when a report of proceedings is improperly
filed; second, when and how an election not to file a report of
proceedings is to be filed if the original praccipe calls for a
report of proceedings; third, when the record must be transmitted to the reviewing court after an election not to file a
report of proceedings is made.
The case came before the court in the following manner: Upon
the resignation of the bank as trustee, after having instituted
foreclosure proceedings, one Reynolds was appointed successor
trustee. One Dolan and several bondholders filed an intervening petition, in which they stated that Dolan had been appointed
successor trustee under the terms of the trust agreement, and
asked that he be substituted for Reynolds as complainant in
the foreclosure, and that the order appointing Reynolds be
vacated.
Upon the written motion of Reynolds and the foreclosure
defendants, Dolan's petition was dismissed. Dolan and the
bondholders' committee appealed from the order of dismissal,
and Reynolds and the foreclosure defendants filed motions to
dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the record was not
filed in the Appellate Court within the time pres~ribed by the
rules.
The order appealed from was entered on June 1, 1934. On
August 29, 1934, the petitioners filed their notice of appeal, and
on September 7, 1934, filed their praccipe for record which included "19. Report of proceedings." The record was filed in the
Appellate Court on November 7, 1934. The record showed that
on July 9, 1934, a "report of proceedings in connection with
order entered in this cause on the 17th day of April, 1934, appointing HARRY REYNOLDS successor in trust to the WEST 'SIDE
TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK OF CHICAGO,"
was filed in the lower
court. This had been filed in connection with another and different appeal and had no relation to the instant case. No report of
proceedings in connection with the order appealed from was
filed.
Attached to the record, after the certification of the clerk,
was an instrument headed "Election of L. H. HEYMANN, ET AL.,
appellants, not to file their own report of proceedings or stipula1 Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division, Case No. 37939.
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tion of facts." This unverified, undated instrument was signed
by counsel for appellants. Appellants stated that they did not
contend that the instrument attached to the record was the
election of appellants but was merely attached to the record to
advise the court that they elected not to file a report of proceedings on October 22, 1934.
The court on these facts and the state of the record decided
that an election not to file a report of proceedings, once it had
been set forth in the praccipe, should and must be a written
order to the clerk "not to include any proceedings at the trial
in the record on review."
Such an order or election, when
filed, becomes a part of the record. This proceeding is not set
forth in the rules of court, which merely states, "No dismissal
shall be made by the trial court where appellant, after filing his
praecipe, elects not to include any proceedings at the trial
in the record on review, and transmits the record on appeal to
the reviewing court in proper time without such proceedings. "2
It is this point, in particular, which caused considerable confusion because the filing of a report of proceedings allows an
extension of sixty days to an appellant to file his record in a
reviewing court.3 Appellant in this cause argued that having
elected to file a report of the proceedings, he would have this
time even though he later elected not to file the report of
proceedings.
On this rather important point, the court held that if a
proper election not to file a report of proceedings is made, then
the record must be transmitted to the Appellate Court within
the thirty-five days prescribed by the rules of court for filing
of appeals from service of the notice of 4 appeal when no report
of proceedings is included in the record.
However, unfortunately for the appellants in this case, they
filed their record in the Appellate Court without a report of the
proceedings, but not within the thirty-five day time limit. The
election not to fie a report of the proceedings was a nullity,
being no election at all. Consequently, as a matter of law, it
followed that the record had not been filed in the Appellate
Court within the time prescribed by the rules. 5 The court
decided this question on the assumption, presumed for the argument, that the appellants were entitled to a report of the proceedings in the reviewing court.
After stating this, the court went on to say that actually
2 Supreme Court Rule 36, sec. 1, par. (e); Appellate Court Rule 1, sec. 1,
par. (e).
S Supreme Court Rule 36, sec. 2, par. (a) and (b), and sec. 1, par. (c)
Appellate Court Rule 1, see. 2, par. (a) and (b), and sec. 1, par. (c).
4 Appellate Court Rule 10, as amended.
5 Appellate Court Rule 10, as amended.
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in the case the judgment of the lower court was based solely
upon the pleadings and that the two petitions were dismissed
for want of equity on the motion to dismiss. The court held
that this proceeding was the same as though a demurrer had
been sustained under the old practice; 6 and, accordingly, a
report of proceedings was unnecessary and improper.
The court goes on to say that to hold otherwise would, in
actual practice, render the time limit fixed by the rules for the
filing of a record on review purely nugatory. Thus, they will
follow the old practice in that any cause decided purely on pleadings is one in which a report of proceedings is improper.
The clear and concise logic of the court in determining these
issues is so convincing that it seems quite clear that even if the
case were taken to the Supreme Court, the Appellate Court
would be sustained in its action in dismissing this appeal on the
motion of the appellees for the reasons given. The court, of
course, cites no authority, there being none on which to base
the matters determined, inasmuch as this is a case of first
impression under the act.
J. E. BRUNSWICK
EXTENT OF AMENDMENT PERMITTED IN COMPLAINT AFTER
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN ON ORIGINAL CAUSE OF

ACTION.-The first decision, by an appellate court, in relation
to amendments since the Civil Practice Act, was given by the
Appellate Court of the Fourth District in Randall Dairy Company v. Peveley Dairy Company,1 where the court decided that
the lower court had ruled correctly in refusing to dismiss the
cause because the right of action had accrued more than the statutory period before the filing of the amended complaint.
The case was originally commenced in September of 1932,
and taken to the Appellate Court, 2 where it was reversed. An
amended complaint was fied under the Civil Practice Act on
May 19, 1934. To this amended complaint, the defendants duly
filed a motion to strike, on the grounds that (1) the court exceeded its jurisdiction because the cause was commenced before
January 1, 1934, and (2) that the cause of action (slander)
accrued more than one year before May 19, 1934. The motion
was denied. Again taken to the Appellate Court, the court,
in passing on the second point raised in the motion, said "that
the complaint was in reality an amended declaration, in lieu
of the original, seems obvious, and as it is apparent that it
related to the same transaction as the original pleading, and was
6 Civil Practice Act, sec. 45.
1278 Ill. App. 350 (1935).
2274 IlL App. 474 (1935).
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filed to supplement and supply defects therein, it was sufficient
within the terms of said sec. 46, 3 and should be held to relate
back to the date of filing the original declaration; therefore,
as there has been no question raised that the original pleading
was not filed within apt time, we think the complaint was sufficient to comply with said section, and did not show on its face
that the action did not accrue within the statutory period for
the commencement of the suit. As to this ground we think the
ruling of the trial court was right."
The case leads us to a consideration of just how far the courts
may go under the new Act in permitting amendments. It is
clear that such amendments, supplying any material elements
of a cause of action, could not be4 made at common law after the
Statute of Limitations had run.
To eliminate this hardship of depriving a man of his cause
of action merely because of some technical blunder, Illinois
passed an Act in 1929,5 intended to eliminate this difficulty. It
is interesting to note the reaction of the courts to this amendment. In Zister v. Pollock,6 the court held: "The 1929 amendment was intended to obviate omission of some allegation which
in no way affected the existing facts or merits of the cause
asserted." In Townsend v. Postal Benefit Association,7 the court
held: "An amendment which merely changed a party was not
barred by the Statute of Limitations." In Pfeffer v. The Farmers' State Bank,8 the court said: "An amendment changing the
charge of negligence from two to only one defendant on the
theory of respondeat superior did not state a new cause of
3 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933),
Ch. 110, sec. 174, which reads in part: "(2)
The cause of action, cross-demand or defense set up in any amended pleading
shall not be barred by lapse of time under any statute or contract prescribing
or limiting the time within which an action may be brought or right asserted,
if the time prescribed or limited had not expired when the original pleading
was filed, and if it shall appear from the original and amended pleadings that
the cause of action asserted, or the defense or cross-demand interposed in the
amended pleading grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set up on
the original pleading, even though the original pleading was defective in that it
failed to allege the performance of some act or the existence of some fact or
some other matter which is a necessary condition precedent to the right of
recovery or defense asserted when such condition precedent has in fact been
performed, and for the purpose of preserving as aforesaid such cause of action,
cross-demand or defense set up on such amended pleading, and for such purpose only, any such amendment to any pleading, shall be held to relate back
to the date of the filing of the original pleading so amended."
4 For a comparatively recent case stating the common law rule, see Taylor
v. Anderson, 14 F. (2d) 353, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
7th District, in which the court followed the linois law.
5 Session Laws (1929), p. 578.
6262 Ill. App. 170 (1931Y.
7263 Ill. App. 483 (1931).
8263 Ill. App. 360 (1931).
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action." Then came the case of Holden v. Schley.9 This was an
action for wrongful death, and the plaintiff failed to allege that
he was in the exercise of due care; the Appellate Court said that
the addition of this allegation after one year, stated a new
cause of action, and despite the amendment statute, could not
be made.
The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court, 10 but
merely on the grounds that this was not a material and necessary allegation and did not disturb the holding of the Appellate
Court with respect to its decision on allowing the amendment.
Thus the Act of 1929 did not accomplish its purpose.
In other jurisdictions which have codes, there is much diversity as to the allowing of amendments. Many of the code states
even today, do not allow an amendment which changes the cause
of action. We find in Pomeroy, Code Remedies, at page 441, this
statement with relation to amendment: "This authority is conferred in very broad terms with the limitation, however, that
the cause of action or defense shall not be substantially changed."
He then cites a great many states which follow this rule, and
lays it down as a general principle of code pleading. Under this
rule, of course, there can be no question of the running of the
Statute, for a new cause of action cannot be stated without
starting a new suit.
Under earlier rules in code jurisdictions it was clear that a
change of cause of action from one theory to another was not
permissible. Clark on Code Pleading, at page 515, sets out the
following as examples of diverse amendments allowed in various jurisdictions:
"Where it added more particular or different allegations regarding defendant's negligence;"' where it alleged that the
deceased was killed while being carried as an employee instead
of as a passenger; 12 where it made a party coplaintiff who was
originally made defendant;13 where it alleged the provisions of
a foreign statute upon which the original action was brought ;14
where it charged defendant as an individual rather than in a
representative capacity;15 where it set forth that the action was
brought by the widow as administratrix, instead of by herself
and children as the real parties in interest. 16 And the following
cases: Where the amendment was refused; where it substituted
9271 Ill.
App. 169 (1933).
10 355 Ill.
545, 190 N. E. 80 (1934).
11 Jeffersonville M. & I. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48 (1872).
12 Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Salmon, 14 Kan. 512 (1875).
13 Buel v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 45 Mo. 562 (1870).
14 Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. Co., 136 N. C. 89, 48 S. E. 642 (1904).
15Tighe v. Pope, 16 Hun (N. Y.) 180 (1878).
16 Pugmine v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26 Utah 115, 72 P. 385 (1903).
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another beneficiary in place of the one named in the original
declaration, and thereby changed the amount of recovery; 17
where it set forth a statutory in place of a common law liability
of services of a child;1 8 where it stated a death action in place
of an action for personal injuries ultimately resulting in
death. "1 9
The section of the Civil Practice Act under consideration in
the principal case, seems broad enough to cover any amendment
necessary to the proper culmination of a case once it is started,
and the language of the Appellate Court seems to indicate that
that court, at least, has taken such a view. Of course, it did
not have a fine point before it and the original pleading did
state a cause of action, although defectively. However, it
would seem from the language of the statute, and from a consideration of all other sections of the Act, that its intent is to
permit a party to set forth the facts which constitute the grounds
upon which he wishes to proceed; and if for some reason, he has
omitted some essential allegation, to add such matter, if it
happened at the time of the occurrence or transaction referred to.
In other words, the intent of the Act seems to be that if a
plaintiff is diligent enough to start a law suit within the period
fixed by law, he is not to be barred from his action because
of a technical blunder even though such blunder may be the
omission of a material allegation.
J. E. BRUNSWICK

17 Atlanta K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Hooper, 92 F. 820, 35 C. C. A. 24 (Tenn.,
1899).
18 City of Kansas City v. Hart, 60 Kan. 684, 57 P. 938 (1899).
19 Bolick v. Southern R. Co., 138 N. C. 370, 50 S. E. 689 (1905).

